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Applied Ethics: A misnomer for a field?  
Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association 2016 
Leslie P. Francis 
 
[slide 1] Perhaps because today is April Fools’ Day, or perhaps because a 
Presidential Address is both an enormous honor and very intimidating, I 
decided to rush in and take this occasion to think seriously about the shape 
of the field in which I work. 
 
I work in a field often called “applied ethics.”  It’s a very young field—when 
I started graduate school, the field didn’t have a name, John Rawls’s A 
Theory of Justice was at the center of normative ethics (if normative ethics 
existed at all in the wake of non-cognitive assaults), and serious 
philosophers were just turning their attention to areas such as bioethics.  The 
Journal of Social Philosophy and Social Theory and Practice both began in 
1970 and Philosophy and Public Affairs published its first issue in 1971.  
The Society for Applied Philosophy was founded in 1982 and began 
publishing the Journal of Applied Philosophy in 1984.  The Association for 
Practical and Professional Ethics is celebrating its 25th anniversary this year.   
 
Sub- or related fields such as bioethics or environmental ethics are young 
too. A comprehensive organization for bioethics, the American Society for 
Bioethics and Humanities, began only in 1998 with the merger of three 
smaller organizations; the journal Bioethics began publishing in 1987 and 
volume one of Environmental Ethics appeared in 1979.  
 
So with about 25 years to look back on, I’m going to advance several mild 
claims in this talk: that “applied ethics” is a misnomer, that it reflects a 
misguided approach to work in applied fields, and that we can do better.   
 
More specifically, it suggests that there are theoretical paradigms or 
principles such as autonomy that are developed independently.  [slide 2] 
Theory development is one field—“ethics”—and theory application is 
another—“applied ethics” (or maybe “practical” –could it be opposed to 
“impractical”? –ethics?)  The ethical principles are separate from the 
problems to which they apply. [slide 3]   
These principles are then “applied” to real world circumstances in top-
down fashion.  [slide 4] 
The enterprise is unidirectional; the ethical approaches do not learn 
from the problems to which they are applied and their context.  [slide 5]    
 
On this picture the theoretical paradigms pick out the problems to be 
addressed: decisions to withdraw or withhold treatment [slide 6], treatment 
of patients who lack decision making capacity [slide 7], experimentation 
with human subjects [slide 8], or protection of confidentiality [slide 9]. 
Other problems recede to the background, discussed as an afterthought if at 
all [slide 10].   
   
This is very, very wrong.  In the first part of my talk, I’m going to explain 
these ways in which it goes wrong in more detail.  Then, I’ll sketch out some 
ways in which, I hope, we can do better.  To avoid suspense I’ll tell you at 
the outset that I have a radical new name for the field: ethics. 
 
1.  So how do we go wrong? 
 
1.1 Let me start with selecting problems in the field and the example of 
ethics and infectious disease. 
A few years ago, four of us published The Patient as Victim and 
Vector: Ethics and Infectious Disease. (Battin et al. 2008) [slide 11] The 
original idea was the brainchild of my friend and colleague, Peggy Battin:  
how, she asked, would bioethics have looked different if it had emerged 
when infectious disease had been at the forefront of pressing problems rather 
than being thought of as largely a phenomenon of the past?   Sometime in 
the late 1970s, the US surgeon general had reportedly said “It is time to 
close the book on infectious disease”—no one knows exactly when or where 
this was said, or even if it was said, but it is widely quoted as reflecting 
views of public health in the years just before the AIDS epidemic, the years 
when bioethics was beginning to flourish as a field. 
 
In PVV, as we called the book, we argued that infectious disease presents a 
kind of naturalized Rawlsian thought experiment:  we are all victims and 
vectors to each other, interconnected in a web of actual and potential disease 
transmission.  At any given point, we do not know where we are in the web: 
we could be sitting next to someone with multidrug resistant tuberculosis 
[slide 12], staying with a friend who spent the weekend before hiking in a 
remote area and was exposed to hantavirus [slide 13], or dragging ourselves 
to class with the flu [slide 14]. So infectious disease reminds us that we are 
all in this together.  We need to rethink traditional issues such as informed 
consent or confidentiality, asking people to consider the impact of their 
decisions on others and informing them not only of the effects of their 
decisions on themselves but also of the effects on others and potentially once 
again on themselves.  And we need to think about new problems:  planning 
for outbreaks, justice in primary care, forms of disease management that 
reduce overall transmission risks, and compensation for those in harm’s way 
such as first responders.   
 
As we were writing PVV, we thought the explanation was that bioethics had 
developed at a time when problems of individual autonomy such as 
withdrawing or withholding high-tech life-sustaining treatment were at the 
fore.  The field, we thought, simply not been exposed to infectious disease; 
bringing it to the center could force a paradigm shift.  I now think this 
analysis is not sufficiently radical.  Perhaps, instead, much early work in 
bioethics paid attention to problems such as withholding and withdrawing 
care because ethical concepts such as autonomy could readily be applied to 
them, not because the problems themselves stood out for attention.  After all, 
HIV appeared on the scene almost immediately after the surgeon general 
supposedly closed the book.  In 1979, although smallpox had been 
eradicated, polio cases numbered in the hundreds of thousands worldwide 
and the World Health Organization resolution to eradicate polio did not 
occur until 1988. [slide 15]  In 1979, to the extent that malaria control was 
effective it was the result of the use of pesticides such as DDT; the WHO 
had decided that eradication was not a viable strategy and where treatment 
was available it consisted primarily of fever management. (Snow et al. 2012)  
The problems of infectious disease were all around: a lens of autonomy just 
did not focus on them. [slide 16] 
 
And even when HIV appeared on the scene, it was largely seen through 
autonomy. Primary attention was paid to issues such as data confidentiality, 
partner notification, demands for rapid access to therapy, and the wrongs of 
quarantine.  Other problems such as racial disparities in access to care and 
support, the lack of an adequate public health infrastructure to treat sexually 
transmitted diseases, homelessness, partner abuse, or punitive immigration 
policies were largely off the ethical radar screen—albeit not entirely off the 
legal radar screen (e.g. Rothenberg & Paskey 1995)—and their impact 
remains today. 
 
1.2 Top-down approaches are unidirectional.  As such, they do not learn 
from and are not reshaped by the people and contexts to which they apply.  
Consider as one example the application of autonomy to people with 
impaired decision-making capacities facing difficult medical choices.  [slide 
17] On a top-down model, the starting place is an idealization of autonomy:  
to be considered capable of making decisions on their own, individuals must 
have a basic understanding of their condition, treatment alternatives, and 
their likely outcomes.  They must be able to understand and articulate their 
values and apply these values to the decision to be made.  And they must be 
able to communicate their choices.  If their choices do not reflect their 
values in at least some recognizable way, questions will be raised about their 
decision-making capacity. [slide 18] Health care providers will be advised 
either to seek a formal evaluation of capacity or to turn to surrogate 
decision-makers to act for the patient.  To be sure, capabilities fluctuate and 
health care providers are reminded to manage patients to maximize their 
involvement in decision-making.  Capabilities are also a matter of degree—
some people will understand, reason, and communicate better than others—
and so Buchanan and Brock (1990) and others have proposed to take this 
into account by adjusting the requisite level of capacity by the seriousness 
and irrevocability of the decision at hand.  Decisions to withdraw or 
withhold life-sustaining treatment thus would require a more stringent 
standard for capacity than decisions to forego a knee replacement that might 
improve mobility.  Value structures are complex as well; Agnieszka 
Jaworska (1999), for example, argues that people with dementia may still be 
capable of originating critical interests if the objects of these interests are 
external to the person and they can still be fulfilled and if the person 
maintains some sense of what is good even without an overall narrative of 
his or her life. 
 
These approaches to autonomy, I have argued with Anita Silvers, apply an 
unduly constrained picture of decision-making to people with intellectual 
disabilities.  They all assume that individuals understand and articulate their 
values on their own, an assumption at best partially true for most of us. 
[slide 19] Even Jaworska’s article—developed importantly on the basis of 
her experiences as a fellow at the National Institutes of Health—limits the 
participation of prosthetic decision-makers to helping people with dementia 
engage in means-end reasoning and implement their choices.  
 
Consider by contrast to the approach to legal status developed in the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (the 
“CRPD”).  The CRPD, developed by a process that exemplifies the 
disability rights slogan “nothing about us without us,” affirms inclusion as a 
basic principle.  Article 12 of the CRPD reaffirms that people with 
disabilities have the right to recognition as full legal persons and must enjoy 
legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life.  [slide 20] 
Accordingly, states parties to the CRPD must take measures to provide 
support for persons to exercise their legal capacity and appropriate and 
effective safeguards to prevent abuse.  Article 12 of the CRPD has 
stimulated efforts in many jurisdictions to develop structures for supported 
decision-making, decision-making in which persons with intellectual 
disabilities work with another to develop, articulate, apply, and implement 
their values.  These efforts surely raise very difficult philosophical 
questions:  for example, what it is for values to be authentically those of the 
individual and what exploitation is and how to protect against it.  
Developing answers to these questions will also be informed by continuing 
research in neuroscience. My point here is not that these questions are 
simple, but that they are critical to understanding autonomy itself as an 
evolving concept and cannot be addressed without interaction with people 
with intellectual disabilities.  How to do this is the philosophical task, not 
how to instruct surrogate decision makers on substituted judgment or best 
interests. 
 
Nor is this a strong form of standpoint theory that would reject any 
independent epistemological groundings or even accord persons with 
intellectual disabilities special authority with respect to the truth about 
themselves. Rather, it is the recognition that knowledge production is 
interpersonal and social, not entirely individual. The interpretation, 
application, and understanding of principles such as respect for autonomy 
are no exception. 
 
1.3 The “application” paradigm twists methodologies in the fields.  It 
suggests that paramount methodological problems are the selection and 
justification of principles, not their development, articulation, understanding, 
and instantiation.  To illustrate, I’ll take two of the most famous articles 
from the first volume of Philosophy & Public Affairs: Judith Jarvis 
Thomson’s (1971) “A Defense of Abortion” and Peter Singer’s (1972) 
“Famine, Affluence, and Morality.” 
 
Thomson’s famous violinist and his (yes, his) involuntary savior illustrate 
both the best and the worst of thought experiments.  [slide 21] The 
experiment, which I expect is familiar to everyone, asks you to imagine the 
Society of Music Lovers kidnaps you and hooks you up to the violinist in 
order to save his life.  You only need to stay hooked up for nine months.  
There is no alternative method for keeping the violinist alive:  only you.  
Then, Thomson asks, are you obligated to stay hooked up?  Would it violate 
the violinist’s right for you to unhook yourself and return to your ordinary 
life?  Thomson’s answer is “no”—and she thinks yours would be, too.   
 
This thought experiment is the centerpiece of an article with the title “A 
Defense of Abortion.”  It is deployed in an effort to show that abortion can 
be defended even if we grant the assumption that the fetus has a right to life.  
The experiment does show as a matter of abstract inference that it doesn’t 
follow from assuming that the violinist—or, by analogy, a fetus—has a right 
to life that he has a right to the means of life. My students who oppose 
abortion are happy to grant this, but claim that the circumstances of the 
thought experiment are very different from the real world circumstances in 
which pregnancies occur where people act voluntarily in various ways that 
incur responsibilities. 
 
Later in the article, Thomson considers some of these circumstances:  when 
a woman voluntarily “indulges” in intercourse knowing that pregnancy is a 
risk, or when her best efforts at protection fail, or when she acts in ways that 
are important to her well-being but that create a risk of rape.  Thomson 
sidesteps these cases, saying they don’t show that all abortion is unjust 
killing.  But except at their most extreme, opponents of abortion don’t claim 
that all abortion is unjust killing.  Instead, they think that in many cases 
when people consider abortion, it is morally wrong. 
 
So how does Thomson’s thought experiment misfire?  Her title suggests that 
it provides “a defense of abortion” against its critics.  But it does not really 
provide a defense against the positions of many if not most abortion critics.  
Instead, the thought experiment is an analytic tool that distinguishes the 
abstract idea of a right from further specification of the content of the right, 
including whether it includes any claims against others.   
 
Or take Peter Singer’s (1972) “Famine, Affluence, and Morality.” The 
impetus for Singer’s article was the refugee crisis in East Bengal, in which 
he estimated that nine million people had been displaced by poverty, a 
cyclone, and civil war. (Coincidentally, estimates are that at least nine 
million Syrians are refugees today).  In “Famine,” Singer famously argued 
that how people react to such refugee situations cannot be justified and that 
our moral conceptual scheme needs to be altered along with our way of life.  
Here’s Singer’s argument, in a nutshell: 
 --suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are 
bad [slide 22, 23] 
 --if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, 
without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we 
ought to do it (the prevention principle) [slide 24]  
 --we could prevent at least some of the refugee suffering without 
thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance,  
 --therefore we ought to do what is in our power to prevent at least 
some of the refugee suffering. 
 
Singer admits that the prevention principle takes no account of proximity or 
distance, and no account of whether someone is uniquely positioned to 
help—both factors that might be psychologically relevant but, he claims, not 
morally so. 
 
This essay ushered in an entire field of global ethics.  But it did so in a very 
peculiar way:  in the absence of serious consideration of institutions or 
context. For Singer, the primary aspects of context to discuss are what others 
are doing or whether the aid will do any good.  Government enters only as a 
foil, to whether private charitable aid will result in a reduction of 
government aid.  Other institutions, such as NGOs, are entirely absent.  So is 
any discussion of the background of justice or injustice in the societies in 
question. 
 
Indeed, both Thomson’s and Singer’s seminal articles have these features in 
common: neither takes relationships, social or political institutions from the 
family to the state, or background contexts of justice or injustice into 
account, in any significant way.  There are of course many possible 
explanations for this:  the time in which they wrote (the early 1970s) and 
their roots in liberal theory and individualism.  But I would suggest another:  
both took principles of interest—in Thomson’s case a view about rights and 
in Singer’s a form of utilitarianism—and traced out their implications for the 
issue at hand.  Thomson, for example, does not consider the context in 
which the abortions she was discussing take place and whether there is 
adequate social support for people with disabilities.  And Singer never raises 
the issue of injustice within the societies under discussion, either England or 
East Bengal.  
 
I should emphasize that I am not attacking principles per se; particularism 
gets it wrong, too. I agree with the late John Arras (2013), writing on 
“Theory and Bioethics” in the Stanford Encyclopedia: “But on the other 
hand, many who work in the area of bioethics, including many philosophers, 
are highly skeptical of the so-called “applied ethics” model of moral 
reasoning, in which exemplars of high theory (e.g., consequentialist 
utilitarianism, Kantian deontology, rights-based theories, natural law, etc.) 
are directly “applied” to practical problems. Indeed, most philosophically-
inclined contributors to the bioethics literature have eschewed high moral 
theory in favor of various modes of moral reasoning falling on a spectrum 
between the strong particularism of various strains of casuistry or narrative 
ethics, on one end, and the mid-level norms of the enormously influential 
“principlism” of Beauchamp and Childress, on the other ….”  [slide 25] 
 
2. So, much more importantly, how do we get it right? 
 
In keeping with how I approach non-ideal theorizing, I don’t think we have a 
complete answer to how theory and practice intertwine.  Rather, I think we 
have strategies for doing ethics better.  Here, I’m going to outline briefly an 
approach to non-ideal theory, and then deploy it illustratively in two 
contexts: first, reasonable accommodations and the recognition of individual 
differences and, second, aid in dying and the recognition of context. 
 
2.1. Non-ideal theory.  John Rawls famously introduced the distinction 
between ideal theory and partial compliance theory in A Theory of Justice. 
(1971) [slide 26] While theorizing about justice for ideal circumstances, 
Rawls recognized that different approaches might be needed where either 
natural or social circumstances were less than ideal.  For my purposes here, 
this attention to contexts is the most important point about non-ideal theory. 
With respect to justice, for example, non-ideal theory treats issues such as 
how progress can best be made toward justice, what injustices take 
precedence to address, what strategies are likely to create new roadblocks to 
overcoming injustice, or what are the obligations of individuals or 
institutions when others continue to behave unjustly. (Cohen 2000; Miller 
2011). 
 
Rawls didn’t see the need for non-ideal theory as a problem about ideals, but 
as about whether real world circumstances were such that ideals could 
reasonably be applied to them. Subsequently, discussions of non-ideal and 
partial compliance theory have burgeoned.  But these discussions, too, 
largely see the problems as lying with existing circumstances, not with the 
construction of ideals. [slide 27] For example, Zofia Stemplowska, in 
“What’s Ideal about Ideal Theory?” sees ideal theory as “theory that fails to 
issue recommendations for how to improve our society that are applicable 
for us here and now.”  She thinks theories that assume full compliance (and 
thus are inapplicable to present circumstances) can still be useful because 
they provide a standard against which to judge whether comparatively we 
are taking steps towards the ideal and to have a picture of what an ideal 
might look like.   
 
Here, I side with Amartya Sen (2009, 2006), in emphasizing the importance 
of comparative rather than transcendental theories of justice.  Sen argues that 
theories of justice need not take a complete or totalist form for many 
reasons, including information gaps, difficulties in judging among 
considerations that have a dimension of weight, or the need to make political 
room for areas of agreement among different points of view. A major driver 
of Sen’s approach is his view about the limits of social choice and the ability 
of decision procedures to yield partial but incomplete agreement. My 
starting places are somewhat different.  As I see justice, it is a matter of 
ongoing work at inclusion and flourishing:  what next steps, at individual or 
social levels, will enable individuals in all their differences to do well at 
what matters to them? In my view, a picture of ideal justice might be so 
abstract as to be vacuous, so fuzzy as to be unrecognizable [slide 28], or 
perhaps even positively misleading.  [slide 29] The same is true about 
idealizations of autonomy [slide 30] In discussing how comparative justice 
might work, Sen gives the example of the United States providing more 
universal health insurance but remaining a society in many respects unjust. I 
would develop this example by arguing that the US is a more just society if 
it includes more people receiving funding for health care appropriate to their 
conditions and choices, when others are already receiving similar care, 
without having a complete picture of what a fully just health care system 
would look like. Indeed, given developing technology, changing 
understandings of the nature of disease, the ever-shifting world of disease 
itself, and conflicting demands on social resources, we may not be able to 
say what a fully just health care system would look like. Idealization might 
tempt us to say:  it would be a system in which everyone got the greatest 
amount of needed health care possible under the circumstances.  But this 
idealization might be vacuous—what is this greatest amount?—or, more 
disturbing, it might lead us into a situation (not so unrecognizably like the 
problems we have today) wherein everyone might think that getting more 
health care for themselves is a matter of urgent justice, when it might not be 
comparatively more just at all.  In her critical review of Sen, Frances Kamm 
(2011) quite rightly observes that correcting one injustice—those left out of 
health care—might create others, as Oregon attempted to implement limits 
on some forms of care in order to expand its Medicaid program. [slide 31, 
32] She is of course right—non-ideal theory is messy in this way—but it 
doesn’t follow that we need an ideal of full inclusion to decide which is the 
preferable injustice.  Rather, we need to keep challenging, evaluating and 
reevaluating the exclusionary effects of policy changes such as Oregon’s 
rationing scheme. 
 
2.2. Individual differences and accommodations.  Since enactment of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act in 1990, and the Rehabilitation Act before it 
in 1973, US law has developed an extensive jurisprudence of reasonable 
accommodations. The ADA employment provision states that it is 
discrimination to fail to make “reasonable accommodations to the known 
physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a 
disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can 
demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on 
the operation of the business of such covered entity.” (42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) 
(5)) [slide 33] Critics of the ADA claim that the reasonable accommodation 
requirement is not a civil right, but a special privilege that benefits people 
with disabilities at the expense of other employees and imposes significant 
and unjustifiable costs on employers more generally.  Assessing this claim 
requires attention to individual differences and their significance. 
 
Many factors affect workplace design: history, convenience, social 
conventions, efficiency, costs, and inertia, among others.  Often, these 
factors are unrelated to the goals of jobs, skills needed to perform them, or 
modes of performance.  Working in a room that is accessible only by 
climbing stairs [slide 34], wearing robes, sitting for long periods of time, or 
being elevated on a high bench is not relevant to judging, for example. [slide 
35] Nor does impartiality require that oral arguments take exactly one hour 
without breaks, that case materials be filed in a format that is in practice 
inaccessible to people with visual impairments, or that Communication 
Access Realtime Translation (CART) be the only technology provided for 
people with hearing impairments in court—as a common portrayal of justice 
reminds.  [slide 36] Changes in longstanding practices may be inconvenient 
or expensive, but this is a different question than whether actual or potential 
employees are capable of performing essential job functions. There may of 
course be disputes about what are essential job functions or whether 
alternative modes of performance are effective.  But as Anita Silvers and I 
and coauthors argued in “Accommodating Every Body,” accommodations 
are reasonable when they enable work-capable people to perform jobs 
successfully. (Stein, Silvers, Areheart & Francis 2014) Their costliness is a 
further question; if workplaces have been designed in ways that make it 
easier for typical people to perform, it may be fairer to share redesign costs 
socially rather than letting them fall on particular employers.  But the 
alternative—maintaining the workplace status quo as the presumptively 
acceptable state of affairs—would continue to effectively exclude otherwise 
capable individuals and should thus not be taken as the position against 
which all changes must be evaluated. 
 
Compare this jurisprudence of accommodation against another policy area 
where accommodation has taken a major role: religious beliefs.  The 
connection between non-discrimination and accommodation first made its 
way into US civil rights law in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which defined 
religion for anti-discrimination purposes as including “all aspects of 
religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer 
demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee’s 
or prospective employee’s religious observance or practice without undue 
hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.” (42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j)) 
[slide 37] The primary understanding of this accommodation requirement 
was that employers should be flexible about scheduling, shift assignments, 
or dress requirements that might interfere with individuals’ practice of their 
religions. Here, as later with disability accommodation, the goal was shaping 
the workplace to allow capable individuals with different religious 
commitments to perform their jobs successfully.  More recently, employers 
have claimed accommodation rights with respect to obligations to provide 
contraceptive coverage under the Affordable Care Act—claims that may 
impede rather than recognizing difference. Their argument is that filing a 
form to claim a religious exemption violates their free exercise of religion 
under statutory and constitutional law.  The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals 
determined that this notice requirement did not unduly burden religious 
liberty because the employers are not required to provide coverage or bear 
any costs with respect to coverage, are not penalized for failing to provide 
coverage, and are not themselves required to do anything with respect to 
coverage other than giving notice.  In other words, all the employer needs to 
do is to self-affirm that its religious beliefs prohibit the coverage—hardly a 
requirement with the effect of excluding people with religious beliefs 
opposed to contraception. By comparison, employees who do not share their 
employers’ beliefs and who wish to use contraception will be excluded from 
an important benefit available to others if they do not receive this health 
benefit from other sources. [slide 38]  
 
2.2. Now consider aid in dying and the importance of context.  Legalization 
of aid-in-dying in the United States is a continuing goal of defenders of 
patient autonomy.  At present, aid in dying (but not physician-administered 
dying) is legally permitted in Vermont, Montana, California, Oregon, and 
Washington.  Active campaigns for legalization are under way in more than 
20 other states, including Colorado, Massachusetts, and New York.  The 
primary argument for aid-in-dying is patient autonomy; in the words of 
Compassion & Choices: “Everyone who believes in end-of-life options owes 
a debt of gratitude to Brittany Maynard . . .Compassion & Choices is 
honored to join with Brittany’s family to continue her campaign to make aid 
in dying available to every American, no matter where they live.” (C&C 
2016) [slide 39] 
 
Just how the availability of aid in dying enhances autonomy is not fully 
specified, however, and context matters here.  Aid in dying does add an 
option not otherwise available, but the mere addition of an option is 
insufficient for advancing autonomy; whether autonomy is enhanced 
depends on what choices are made effectively available and the importance 
of these choices to the individuals who make them.  Clearly, people who 
seek aid in dying over other alternatives want it very strongly indeed—but 
the strength of a desire is also insufficient to show that the availability of 
means to its fulfillment enhances autonomy.  There are reasons beyond 
intensity of desire to think that the option is an important one: it furthers 
experiential interests in being free from pain and other forms of distress and 
in not anticipating pain or distress, and what Dworkin called critical interests 
in living out ones last days on ones own terms and in being remembered as 
one was before the final days of illness took their toll.  In the words of Atul 
Gawande, quoted on the Compassion & Choices (2016a) website: “Spending 
one’s final days in an ICU because of terminal illness is for most people a 
kind of failure. You rely on a ventilator, your every organ shutting down, 
your mind teetering on delirium and permanently beyond realizing that you 
will never leave this borrowed, fluorescent place. The end comes with no 
chance for you to have said goodbye or ‘It’s O.K.’ or ‘I’m sorry’ or ‘I love 
you.’” [slide 40] Contemporary forms of palliative sedation—coupled with 
the surety that this will be readily available when needed—can largely 
obviate the need for aid in dying to address experiential interests.  It is 
unclear how aid in dying will do better than planned sedation in enabling 
meaningful closure with others.  No matter how available or well managed, 
however, palliative sedation will not address the critical interests that 
remain:  the ability to choose how one dies and how loved ones remember 
last days.  Context can help with this, too—with support, comfortable 
surroundings, a kind of pre-death lying in state—but it cannot address these 
interests fully.  What this leaves is the question of how important the choice 
of the manner of the last few days really is.  Simplistic arguments from 
autonomy fail to capture these nuances. 
 
Another aspect of the context is advanced by disability activists opposed to 
aid in dying.  These critics are concerned that some people will choose aid in 
dying because of subtle or not-so-subtle forms of coercion—a concern not 
borne out by the data on individuals actually opting for aid in dying, who 
tend disproportionately to be desirous of control over their lives.  (Ganzini, 
Goy & Dobscha 2009) Critics also contend that legalization of aid in dying 
expresses or reflects erroneous views about the quality of life of people with 
disabilities; this, too, fails to recognize that aid in dying is being defended 
only as a matter of choice, not as a matter of what would be in the best 
interests of people who are terminally ill or what their quality of life might 
be.  A better contextual argument advanced by its opponents is that aid in 
dying is problematic in circumstances in which people lack adequate access 
to pain management or support for care at home or other supportive services 
such as vocational rehabilitation.  The Netherlands, the initial jurisdiction 
adopting voluntary euthanasia, has universal health care paid for by 
subsidized and income-related premiums.  The Exceptional Medical 
Expenses Act covers additional costs for long-term chronic illness with the 
fundamental goal of helping people to live at home for as long as possible.  
Care includes nursing care, personal care, domestic help, and sheltered 
accommodation. (Alzheimer Europe 2016) In comparison, the US offers far 
less. All of the states in which aid in dying is currently legal have expanded 
Medicaid (one, Montana, is using a demonstration waiver as an alternative to 
traditional Medicaid), but there are now eight states with pending aid in 
dying bills that have not expanded Medicaid. (C&C 2016, statereforum 
2016) [slide 41] In the states with aid in dying, the average rate of people 
under 65 without insurance in 2014 was 10.4% (with a range of 7% in 
Vermont to 15% in Montana).  In the states with aid in dying bills that have 
not expanded Medicaid, the comparable numbers were 12.9%, with a high of 
18% and a low of 10%. (KFF 2016) As for home health, California covers 
unlimited amounts for both the categorically and the medically needy and 
Washington covers two visits a day for these groups. Other states offer more 
limited benefits, often for smaller numbers of people. These are essential 
services for people to be able to live in their communities.   
 
My point here is not that we must always choose access to health care over 
aid in dying, or even that we have to choose between the two.  Rather, it is 
that if we understand the contexts in which these policies are defended we 
can see what each actually might do with respect to autonomy.  We can, that 
is, see more specifically both how aid in dying might expand autonomy and 
why people with disabilities might think that advocacy for Medicaid or 




You may have guessed that I’m a pragmatist, methodologically.  To that, I 
plead guilty; I think ethics could learn a great deal from the pragmatist 
tradition.  And one of the most important things it could learn is to object to 
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